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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Don Richards appeals his conviction for crimes involving 
the robbery1 of a Brink's ar mored van in St. Thomas, the 
Virgin Islands. He contends that he is entitled to a new trial 
for three separate reasons: (1) violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right arising from the admission of an out-of- 
court statement given by a non-testifying co-defendant; (2) 
violation of the Jencks Act based on the gover nment's 
failure to produce an FBI agent's written report concerning 
the co-defendant's oral statements; and, (3) jur or 
misconduct. 
 
We conclude that the admission of the co-defendant's 
statement violated Richards' Sixth Amendment right to 
confront witnesses under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 
123 (1968). Richards' failure to object to this admission 
during trial, however, allows him relief only if the plain 
error tenets of Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) apply. Under this 
doctrine, we find that the error was not r eversible. 
Overwhelming evidence of Richards' guilt exists 
independent of the statement; therefore, no manifest 
injustice occurred at trial. 
 
The Jencks Act argument fails for the identical reason. 
We hold that the government's failur e to produce the FBI 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Richards was found guilty of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 371, interference with commer ce and aiding and abetting in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. SS 1951 and 2; possession offirearm during crime of 
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1); and, first degree robbery 
and aiding and abetting in violation of 14 V .I.C. SS 1862(2) and (11). 
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agent's written report of the co-defendant's oral statement 
violated the Act, but Richards' concomitant failure to object 
necessitates plain error review. As with the Sixth 
Amendment issue, because the fairness of the trial was not 
seriously affected, a new trial is not justified. 
 
Finally, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying two motions for mistrial based on 
juror misconduct. Deciding the first motion alleging intra- 
jury influence would require the court delving into the 
juror's deliberative process -- an inquiry prohibited by Fed. 
R. Evid. 606(b). The second motion alleging jur or bias was 
unfounded. The juror acknowledged during voir dire that he 
knew one of the government witnesses but r emained 
capable of impartially evaluating the evidence. Ther e is no 
evidence to demonstrate that the juror disr egarded his 
obligation to remain unbiased. 
 
We will, therefore, affir m. 
 
I. 
 
Don Richards and Theodore Greenaway were tried jointly 
on the offenses arising from the r obbery of the Brink's 
armored van. According to the trial testimony, Richards 
and Greenaway ambushed the Brink's messenger , Mark 
Kuffy, and Richards put a gun to Kuf fy's head, demanding 
money. Richards hit Kuffy in the head with the gun and 
knocked him to the floor of the van. He then collected the 
bags of money from the van and tossed them to Greenaway. 
 
Two days after the robbery, the driver of the van, Ignatius 
Stevens, confessed to being the inside man in the r obbery. 
He identified Richards as the person who assaulted Kuffy 
and Greenaway as his accomplice. 
 
Greenaway was arrested and interviewed by law 
enforcement officers. In his interview Gr eenaway revealed 
that "Don and the other guy who works for Brink's planned 
the robbery." Greenaway then signed a written confession 
conceding participation in the robbery, but withholding the 
name of the individual collaborating in the crime. FBI 
Special Agent Steven Harker documented the interview, 
including Greenaway's oral statement, in an FBI FD302 
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report. When Richards was arrested later that day he made 
no statement. 
 
Richards and Greenaway were tried jointly. In pretrial 
discovery, Richards' counsel received a r eport authored by 
Special Agent Harker, which informed that Greenaway 
confessed that he and his "friend" had committed the 
robbery. The report noted that Greenaway declined to give 
a name to his "friend." 
 
At trial, Stevens, the Brink's driver, testified that he and 
Richards planned the robbery for two weeks. On the day of 
the crime, he observed Richards walk by the van, turn 
around and walk back. Although Richards was sporting 
Rastafarian dreadlocks and sunglasses, Stevens recognized 
Richards by his distinctive walk (a pronounced limp). 
 
Stevens then testified that on the following mor ning he 
met with Richards, who told him that he hid Stevens' share 
of the money, $25,000, in a particular location. At that 
designated spot, Smith retrieved the money. 
 
Special Agent Harker testified next and read Greenaway's 
written statement into the record. The portion relevant to 
this appeal follows: 
 
       The first time I heard about the idea of r obbing the 
       Brink's armored van was when a friend, whom I do not 
       wish to name, spoke to me about it. He and I talked 
       and my friend told me it would be easy to rob the 
       armored car since there was an inside man. . . . The 
       next time I met with my friend was on the day of the 
       robbery. 
 
The statement continued with the description of the 
different roles Greenaway and his "friend" played in the 
robbery. 
 
On cross-examination, Richards' attor ney asked Special 
Agent Harker whether Greenaway had mentioned Richards 
by name. The exchange was as follows: 
 
       Q: Mr. Harker, the statement Mr . Greenaway made, 
       he made this statement after you had Mr. Richards 
       in custody, correct? 
 
       A: Yes, that's correct. 
 
                                4 
  
       Q: And you questioned Mr. Greenaway, right? 
 
       A: Yes, I did. 
 
       Q: About who is his friend, correct? 
 
       R: That's correct. 
 
       Q: And he never told you his friend was Don 
       Richards, correct? That the friend that he refers to 
       in here is Don Richards. 
 
       A: (Pause) 
 
       Q: You don't remember? 
 
       A: I do remember. 
 
       Q: Tell me who he said his friend was since you 
       know. 
 
       A: He told me that he had a friend named Don, yes. 
 
       Q: Excuse me? 
 
       A: He told me he had a friend named Don. 
 
       Q: But Don is not the friend that he is r eferring to as 
       committing the robbery with him? 
 
       A: That is not correct. 
 
       Q: That's not correct? 
 
       A: That is not correct. 
 
       Q: You're saying the friend he r eferred to in here is 
       Don Richards? That's what you are saying? 
 
       A: What I'm saying is that when we interviewed Mr . 
       Greenaway, in the beginning of the interview-- 
 
At this point, the attorney for the gover nment requested 
a side bar conference: 
 
       MR. ADAMS: One of the things that we want to take 
       evidence is to prevent a Bruton problem 
       with one defendant Greenaway 
       implicating the other defendant. 
 
       THE COURT: That's only in the Gover nment's case. 
       So what is your problem? 
                                 5 
  
       MR. ADAMS: One of the reasons my agent is 
       hesitated (sic) -- 
 
       THE COURT: You told him never to mention it. That 
       is on your examination, not defense 
       counsel's examination. 
 
       MR. ADAMS: I want to make sure you r ealize that. 
 
On redirect, the government further explored the mention 
of Richards in Harker's interview with Gr eenaway: 
 
       Q: You were asked questions by [the defense attorney] 
       about whether or not the defendant during your 
       conversations with him mentioned Don Richards 
       at all; do you remember that? 
 
       A: Yes, I do. 
 
       Q: He doesn't mention it in the written statement, 
       correct? 
 
       A: That is correct. 
 
       Q: Does he mention Don Richards' name at all during 
       the time you interviewed him, that night? 
 
       A: He mentioned the name of Don during the 
       interview. 
 
       Q: Tell us why that name came up, why did he 
       mention that name? 
 
       A: In the beginning of the interview, one of the things 
       we asked him -- because of the information we 
       developed during the case was, we did not believe 
       that he was the number one participant, the head 
       king pin in this. So we asked him, we said, I said 
       to him, "you weren't the one who planned this, 
       were you? And Mr. Greenaway's r esponse was no, 
       that was Don and the other guy who works for the 
       Brinks, for Brinks. 
 
Then, on recross, it was first ascertained by the defense 
that Harkin's FD302 report reiterated Gr eenaway's oral 
statement implicating Richards. 
 
       Q: Mr. Harker, of course you don't have any 
       memorandum of that statement, correct? 
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       A: That's not correct. 
 
       Q: You have one? 
 
       A: I don't have one on my person, no. 
 
       Q: Does the U.S. Attorney have one? 
 
       A: He has, yes. 
 
       Q: The memorandum of that kind of information? 
 
       A: We did a report, an FD302 to that effect, yes. It 
       would have accompanied or should have 
       accompanied the statement. 
 
       THE COURT: You don't have it, counsel? 
 
       MR. WATLINGTON: Of course not, your Honor. 
 
When the government was questioned about Harker's FD 
302 Report, it responded that although the document had 
been produced in discovery, it was not disclosed because 
the government had made a conscious decision that the 
evidence should not go in to avoid the Sixth Amendment 
dilemma which surfaces in joint trials of co-defendants. The 
report was then provided to defense counsel. 
 
After some discussion of the complication posed by 
Harker's testimony, the court asked the parties how they 
wished to proceed. Both defense counsel concurr ed that 
they were ready to proceed and no objection was made. 
 
The trial progressed. The remaining significant testimony 
introduced by the prosecution was elicited from Richards' 
mother, who testified that Greenaway and Richards were 
"friends." This testimony obviously led the jury to assume 
that the "friend" mentioned in Greenaway's statement was 
Richards. 
 
When it came time to instruct the jury, at the 
government's request the District Court instructed the jury 
not to consider the portion of Special Agent Harker's 
testimony relating to Greenaway's statement referring to 
"Don." There were no objections to the jury charge. 
 
Three months after the jury delivered its guilty verdict on 
all counts, Richards filed a motion for a new trial based on 
the affidavit submitted by an alternate jur or, Jasha Joseph. 
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The affidavit alleged that during the trial two other jurors, 
in the presence of other members of the panel, had opined 
that Richards was guilty. The District Court denied the 
motion without a hearing because disposition of the motion 
would require an inquiry into jury deliberations prohibited 
by Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). 
 
Six months after the verdict, but prior to sentencing, 
Richards filed a pro se motion for a new trial concerning 
the juror, who was eventually elected jury foreman, and 
that juror's familiarity with the gover nment's chief witness, 
Ignatius Stevens, and Stevens' family. 
 
During sentencing, the District Court reviewed the 
transcript of the voir dire of the juror in question. The juror 
acknowledged that he knew Stevens but assured the court 
that he would judge the case strictly on the evidence. The 
District Court noted that defense counsel questioned the 
prospective juror but did not challenge his selection. The 
District Court, therefore, denied this second motion for a 
new trial. 
 
Richards was sentenced to 121 months of imprisonment 
on the Hobbs Act charge and 60 consecutive months of 
imprisonment on the firearms char ge. The sentence 
imposed on the Virgin Islands char ges was ordered to run 
concurrent with the federal charges. A notice of appeal was 
filed. 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), Bruton 
and his co-defendant, Evans, were tried jointly before a 
jury. At trial, a federal officer testified that Evans had 
confessed to the robbery and had implicated Bruton in his 
confession. The judge instructed the jury that it should 
consider Evans' confession solely in determining Evans' 
guilt and that it should disregard the confession with 
regard to Bruton's involvement. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed Bruton's conviction, holding 
that the introduction of a non-testifying co-defendant's 
confession implicating Bruton violated the accused's right 
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to confront witnesses secured by the Confr ontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 126. The Court emphasized 
the significance of the confession to bolster the 
prosecution's case against Bruton, observing that "Evans' 
confession added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight 
to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross- 
examination since Evans did not take the stand.[Bruton] 
was thus denied his constitutional right of confr ontation." 
Id. at 128. 
 
The Court also expressed doubts regar ding the remedial 
effect of a curative instruction in the Bruton context. The 
Court determined that where the incriminating statements 
of a co-defendant, "who stands accused side by side with 
the defendant, are deliberately spread before a jury in a 
joint trial," the risk that the jury may not follow the 
instruction is too profound. Id. at 135-36. 
 
A later case, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), 
limited Bruton's scope. In Richar dson, the confession of a 
co-defendant, Williams, was redacted to omit reference to 
co-defendant Marsh. Later in the trial, however , Marsh 
testified in such a way, that, despite the r edacted 
confession, the jury might deduce that Marsh participated 
in the crime because of Williams' confession. The Supreme 
Court held that the redacted confession fell outside 
Bruton's scope because it was evidence r equiring "linkage," 
i.e., it became incriminating only when linked with evidence 
introduced later at trial. Id. at 208. 
 
Most recently, in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998), 
Anthony Bell confessed to the police that he, defendant 
Gray and another man beat a man to death. Bell and Gray 
were tried jointly. A redacted statement of Bell's confession 
was read by a detective substituting "deleted" or "deletion" 
when Gray's name appeared. After reading the confession, 
the detective answered affirmatively to the prosecutor's 
question whether the officer was able to arr est Gray after 
Bell's statement. 
 
The Supreme Court held that the confession in Gray, 
which substituted "blanks" and the wor d "delete" for Gray's 
proper name, fell within the class of statements to which 
Bruton's protective rule applied. Unlike Richardson's 
 
                                9 
  
redacted confession, the confession in Gray  referred directly 
to Gray's existence. Thus the Court determined that 
redactions that simply replace a name with a blank space 
or a word such as "deleted" so closely r esemble Bruton's 
unredacted statements that the same legal r esult is 
warranted. Id. at 195. The Court posited that a jury will 
often react similarly to an unredacted confession and a 
confession redacted in the Gray manner , because the jury 
could easily recognize that the confession r efers to the 
defendant. The juror "need only lift his eyes to the [co- 
defendant], sitting at counsel table" to deter mine to whom 
the deletion refers. Id. at 193. 
 
In the present case, the government contends that the 
Bruton error came about only after the defendant's cross- 
examination of Special Agent Harker. W e disagree. The 
initial reading of the confession of Gr eenaway violated 
Bruton. Greenaway's reference to his "friend" was just as 
blatant and incriminating of Richards as the word "deleted" 
in the Gray case. In Gray, the Court held that the following 
redaction violated Bruton: 
 
       "QUESTION: Who was in the group that beat Stacey? 
 
       "ANSWER: Me, deleted, deleted, and a few other guys." 
       . . . . 
 
       Why could the witness not instead have said: 
 
       "QUESTION: Who was in the group that beat Stacey? 
 
       "ANSWER: Me and a few other guys." 
 
Gray, 523 U.S. at 208. 
 
Greenaway's statement here was similar . Greenaway's 
statement referred to the existence of thr ee participants in 
the crime -- Greenaway, the "inside man," and "my friend." 
Since the "inside man" was easily identified as the driver of 
the Brink's van, the reference to "my friend" sharply 
incriminated Richards, the only other person involved in 
the case. To further direct the jury to Richards as the 
unnamed "friend," the prosecutor called Richards' mother 
to testify that Richards and Greenaway wer e friends. We 
thus hold that Bruton, as interpreted in Gray, was violated. 
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Having concluded that a Bruton error occurred, we turn 
to the impact of the introduction of the confession. 
 
Without question, a Bruton err or is one of constitutional 
dimension. See United States v. Dispozo Plastics, Inc., 172 
F.3d 275, 286, n.10 (3d Cir. 1999). Because of the 
significance of the error, we will affirm only if we find that 
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United 
States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
The record, however, indicates that the Bruton issue has 
not been preserved. When the problem came to light, the 
District Court questioned counsel on how the matter 
should be handled. Defense counsel elected to pr oceed 
without requesting a mistrial. Consequently, a new trial can 
be awarded only if the introduction of Gr eenaway's 
statement constitutes plain error. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) provides: "Plain errors or defects 
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they 
were not brought to the attention of the Court." This Rule 
delineating the plain error exception is, however, used 
"sparingly." See United States v. Frady , 456 U.S. 152, 163 
n.14 (1982). In United States v. Young , 470 U.S. 1, 15 
(1985), the Supreme Court authorized the courts of appeals 
to correct only particularly egregious err ors, those that 
"seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings." Id. at 15 (quoting United States v. 
Atkinson, 297 U.S. 151, 163 (1936)). Only when a 
miscarriage of justice would result should we r eview under 
Rule 52(b). Frady, 456 U.S. at 165 n.14. 
 
When reviewing for plain error, we consider, on a case- 
by-case basis, "the obviousness of the err or, the 
significance of the interest protected by the rule that was 
violated, the seriousness of the error in the particular case, 
and the reputation of judicial proceedings if the error 
stands uncorrected. . . ." United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 
200, 205 (3d Cir. 1988). The definitive goal is the 
prevention of manifest injustice. Commonwealth of the 
Virgin Islands v. Smith, 949 F .2d 677, 681 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
Admission of a co-defendant's confession can 
unquestionably jeopardize the fundamental fair ness of a 
criminal trial; an error embroiling the Sixth Amendment 
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right to confront witnesses rates high on the significance 
scale. The statement in this case, however, was not 
sufficiently egregious to requir e a mistrial because the error 
was not particularly obvious nor was it serious given the 
other evidence of Richards' guilt. The cr edible testimony of 
Stevens, the co-conspirator and driver of the Brink's van, 
independently identified Richards as the participant in the 
robbery who handled the gun and harmed the Brink's 
messenger. Stevens also testified that he planned the 
robbery with Richards for two weeks and that, after the 
robbery, Richards met with him and told him where to pick 
up his share of the robbery proceeds. 
 
Additionally, given the District Court's attempt to cure 
the problem by asking the attorneys how they wished to 
proceed, there is no indication that the r eputation of the 
judicial proceedings was tarnished by admission of the 
evidence. 
 
Considering all these factors, we hold that a manifest 
injustice did not occur by the Bruton err or and that the 
admission of the co-defendant's statement was not so 
prejudicial as to constitute plain error . 
 
III. 
 
Defense counsel apparently assumed that the FBI agent's 
discussion of Greenaway's statement at trial would not 
implicate Richards by name. That hope was dashed when 
Special Agent Harker revealed that Greenaway had indeed 
mentioned Richards as the person who planned the 
robbery. 
 
In addition to the Bruton problems raised by the 
reference to Richards in Greenaway's undisclosed oral 
statement, Richards contends that the gover nment violated 
the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. S 3500, in failing to disclose 
Special Agent Harker's complete report r ecounting 
Greenaway's oral statement. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3500 provides, in relevant part: 
 
       S 3500. Demands for production of statements and 
       reports of witnesses 
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        (b) After a witness called by the United States has 
       testified on direct examination, the court shall, on 
       motion of the defendant, order the United States to 
       produce any statement . . . of the witness in the 
       possession of the United States which relates to the 
       subject matter as to which the witness has testified. If 
       the entire contents of any such statement r elate to the 
       subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the 
       court shall order it to be delivered dir ectly to the 
       defendant for his examination and use. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3500(b) (1957). 
 
It is obvious that a Jencks Act violation occurr ed and 
that the government's failure to tur n over the material 
resulted in the Bruton error . Once again, however, defense 
counsel did not make a motion for a mistrial and agr eed to 
proceed with the trial. We, ther efore, are restricted to plain 
error review. 
 
The same concerns discussed under the Bruton issue -- 
the significance of the right invoked, the seriousness and 
obviousness of the error, and the r eputation of the judicial 
proceedings are considered in r eviewing the consequences 
of the Jencks Act violation. Our plain error analysis of the 
Bruton issue mirrors the reasoning applicable here. A 
significant interest was implicated in that the Jencks Act 
violation caused the Bruton violation. The obviousness, as 
discussed, is questionable because the material was 
deliberately withheld to avoid the Bruton pr oblem. The 
seriousness also was minimal given the separate r eliable 
evidence of Richards' guilt. Factoring in the absence of 
damage to the fairness of the judicial pr oceedings, we 
conclude that no manifest injustice occurred by the 
evidentiary violation. 
 
IV. 
 
Two motions for a new trial based on juror misconduct 
were filed following the verdict. Thefirst, filed three months 
after trial, was supported by an affidavit fr om an alternate 
juror who allegedly witnessed misconduct committed by 
two other jurors while the trial was pr ogressing. The basis 
of the motion was that the alternate jur or overheard two 
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jurors comment in the presence of other jurors and prior to 
the close of the evidence that they believed Richar ds was 
guilty. The second motion was filed by Richar ds pro se and 
concerned statements made by a potential jur or who was 
eventually seated. During voir dire, this jur or indicated a 
familiarity with the government's chief witness, Ignatius 
Stevens. The District Court denied the motion r egarding 
intra-jury influence, by relying on Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) 
which prevents inquiry by a court to a jury by asking the 
effect of information on its ver dict.2 
 
The District Court correctly denied the motion. First, a 
Fed R. Crim. P. Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on 
juror misconduct requires that the defendant establish, as 
a preliminary matter, that the evidence is newly discovered 
and that the defendant's failure to discover the information 
during the trial was not a result of lack of diligence. The 
affidavit by the alternate juror was not presented until 
three months after the trial and was vague as to why the 
disclosure of improper jury influence was untimely.3 While 
the defense asserts that Joseph did not alert the defense 
before that time, that does not suffice to cloak the 
information as "newly discovered." If the juror had come 
forward prior to deliberation, the District Court could have 
held a hearing on the possible presence of impr oper intra- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Rule reads: 
 
        (b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. 
 
       Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . ., a juror may 
not 
       testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course 
of 
       the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or 
any 
       other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent 
to 
       or dissent from the verdict . . . or concerning the juror's mental 
       processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify 
on 
       the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
       improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside 
       influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may 
       a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror 
       concerning a matter about which the jur or would be precluded from 
       testifying be received for these purposes. 
 
3. The affidavit was also unclear as to why Joseph believed that there 
was a prejudicial effect upon those jur ors who heard the statements of 
the two jurors concerning their pr emature determination of guilt. 
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jury prejudice. Evaluating evidence of misconduct occurring 
three months after the fact, however, would require the 
District Court to interview the jurors in contravention of 
Rule 606(b). Although the statements by the jur ors 
occurred prior to deliberation, the jur ors would necessarily 
be queried as to their thought process to deter mine 
whether or not the premature statements af fected their 
verdict. Therefore, inquiry as to the statements of these 
jurors would be prohibited under the rule. It was not an 
abuse of discretion in the District Court's failure to grant a 
new trial based on this allegation of intra-jury influence. 
See United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 
1991) ("Of course, under Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), a hearing 
could not be held for the court to ask the jury the effect of 
the information on its verdict"). 
 
The second motion for a new trial based on jur or 
misconduct alleged that the jury foreman was biased 
because he was a friend of the government's witness, 
Ignatius Stevens, and Stevens' family. To or der a new trial 
because of a juror's failure to disclose information at voir 
dire, requires the complaining party to show that a juror 
"failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, 
and then further show that a correct response would have 
provided a valid basis for challenge for cause." McDonough 
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 
(1984). The motives for concealing information may vary, 
but only those reasons that affect a jur or's impartiality can 
be said to affect the fairness of a trial. 
 
The District Court reviewed the transcript of the voir dire 
of the juror in question and determined that the juror did 
not withhold any information. The juror stated he knew the 
government's witness but that he would nonetheless be fair 
and impartial and judge the case strictly on the evidence. 
The District Court noted that defense counsel asked 
questions of the prospective juror and did not challenge the 
juror for cause or ask that the juror be stricken. 
 
Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the appellant's motion for a new trial based on 
the misconduct of this juror. 
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V. 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affir m the judgment 
of sentence. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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